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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the Survey period, Texas courts presided over cases that further
refined the realm of partnership law. Courts were generally strict inter-
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preters of statutes, dissecting and focusing on the language of the law.
Courts highlighted the need to focus on the basics, be it on contract for-
mation, documentation of contributions, or corporate formalities. Courts
further stressed the importance in adhering to the exact statutory lan-
guage (including defining the continuity of ownership status), a type of
judgment—for or against a partnership—and even what constitutes a per-
son. These details can have a drastic effect on the distributions, liability,
or the very existence of the entity. Practitioners must heed the warnings
of these cases as they strive to carefully study and respect statutory re-
quirements, ensuring that their clients’ positions are furthered and not
lost. This article is divided into four sections that will discuss partnership
law cases concerning (1) partnership formation and profit share alloca-
tions; (2) veil piercing; (3) personal liability of a venture; and (4) deriva-
tive suit standing.
II. PARTNERSHIP FORMATION AND RECORD
KEEPING REQUIRMEENTS
A. PARTNERSHIP FORMATION AND TERM SHEETS
Rainier Southlake DST v. Woodbury Strategic Partners Fund, LP1
presents a reminder of the requirements for an enforceable term sheet
and its use in proving the formation of a partnership. Rainier Southlake
DST (Rainier) purchased a twenty-one building portfolio in Southlake,
Texas, with a $15,400,000.00 loan from Midland Loan Services (Midland)
on which Rainier later defaulted.2 Rainier began negotiating with Mid-
land to restructure the loan by discounting the outstanding principal bal-
ance, and by Quarter Circle Capital investing in the loan collateral.3
Quarter Circle Capital identified Woodbury Strategic Partners Fund,
L.P., as a potential investor to purchase the loan at a discounted price for
a preferred return (together with Quarter Circle Capital, the Investors).4
The Investors sent a term sheet to Rainier that set out the terms for
purchase of the loan on February 15, 2012.5 The term sheet stated that the
deadline for Rainier to accept was February 17, 2012; otherwise, it would
automatically be voided.6 The Investors signed the term sheet and so did
Rainier; however, Rainier never returned the term sheet to the Investors
as required, and after signing Rainier proceeded to make material
changes to certain provisions.7
Rainier also began negotiating with another entity and sent Midland a
different proposed term sheet with the new party.8 Due to the multiple,
1. No. 02-16-99263, 2017 WL 6047725, at *7–9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.).




6. Id. at *1–2.
7. Id. at *2.
8. Id. at *3.
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unsettled deals, Midland decided to sell the loan at an auction.9 The In-
vestors purchased the loan through a subsidiary and Rainier sued, alleg-
ing that the term sheet constituted a partnership agreement between
Rainier and the Investors that imposed fiduciary duties on the Investors
that were breached by the sale.10
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals first analyzed the term sheet under
contract formation principles.11 The court held that when Rainier failed
to accept by the deadline (i.e., did not return the term sheet) the power of
acceptance terminated.12 Even if the deadline had not lapsed, there was
no acceptance later because the term sheet was materially altered by
Rainier; it was a counteroffer and not an acceptance of the term sheet.13
This was a particularly influential factor because Rainier was the one try-
ing to enforce the term sheet. Thus, there was no delivery and no accept-
ance, so the term sheet was not an enforceable contract.14
The court next looked at whether a partnership was formed. A written
partnership agreement is not required to form a partnership.15 Instead,
the Texas Business Organizations Code (TBOC) Section 152.052(a) sets
out five factors which, viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances,
determine if a partnership exists: (1) a right to share in the profits; (2)
intent to be partners; (3) participation in the control of the business; (4)
agreement to share losses or liabilities; and (5) agreement to contribute
money or property.16 Since the term sheet was unenforceable, it could
not be used to prove any of the partnership factors.17 For example, for
the right to share in the profits factor, while the term sheet did set out a
profit split, it could not be used as evidence of an agreement to share
profits.18 Similarly, the term sheet was not evidence of an intent to be
partners because it was unenforceable.19 Rainier could not use the term
sheet to show an agreement to contribute money or property to the busi-
ness either.20 Nor was deposition testimony by the investors about antici-
pated or projected contributions evidence, as such contributions did not
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at *5 (citing Brown v. Sabre, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 581, 588 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2005, no pet.)).
12. Id. at *6.
13. Id.
14. See id. at *7.
15. See id. (citing Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 891 (Tex. 2009)).
16. Id.; TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.052(a) (“‘(a) Factors indicating that per-
sons have created a partnership include the persons’: (1) receipt or right to receive a share
of profits of the business; (2) expression of an intent to be partners in the business; (3)
participation or right to participate in control of the business; (4) agreement to share or
sharing: (A) losses of the business; or (B) liability for claims by third parties against the
business; and (5) agreement to contribute or contributing money or property to the busi-
ness.”). Rainier did not argue factors three and four, as there was no evidence to support
either, and the term sheet explicitly negated any control by Rainier. Rainier Southlake
DST, 2017 WL 6047725, at *9.
17. See Rainier Southlake DST, 2017 WL 6047725, at *7–9.
18. Id. at *8.
19. Id.
20. Id. at *9.
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show actual agreement.21 The court also noted that Rainier providing
confidential information and due diligence to the Investors during deal
negotiations was not evidence of an agreement to contribute.22 There-
fore, viewing the totality of the circumstances, the court held that there
was no partnership.23
This case makes clear the threshold requirements for all of those look-
ing to create an enforceable term sheet and to use a term sheet to satisfy
the partnership factors. A term sheet must be accepted according to
traditional contract principles (i.e., signed by both parties and delivered).
Practitioners should be careful to obey all contract formation principles
to ensure an effective term sheet if they intend to rely solely on that term
sheet as proof of a partnership. Practitioners must be equally careful if
they do not want a term sheet to be enforceable and should so provide
specifically in the term sheet.
B. PARTNERSHIP RECORD-KEEPING REQUIREMENTS AND
PROFIT-SHARE ALLOCATION
In Sohani v. Sunesara,24 the First Houston Court of Appeals outlined
the requirements for determining a member’s share of the profits of a
limited liability company. Partners Anis Virani (Virani) and Nizar
Sunesara (Sunesara) sold smoking accessories and devices, first at flea
markets then in a stand-alone store called Zig Zag Smoke Shop (Zig
Zag) starting in 2003, of which Virani was general manager.25 Manisch
Sohani (Sohani) owned a general merchandise wholesale business, Mike’s
Worldwide Imports (MWI), and was one of the vendors for Virani and
Sunesara, contributing inventory to Zig Zag on credit.26 In exchange,
Virani and Sunesara offered Sohani an ownership share of Zig Zag and
agreed to split the profits three ways.27 By 2008, Sunesara was no longer
involved in the daily operations of Zig Zag and was instead serving as
chief financial officer of MWI.28 Virani also worked for MWI but still
managed Zig Zag.29 In 2012, Sunesara and Virani opened a second loca-
tion, Burn Smoke Shop (Burn I), with Sohani contributing inventory.30
Later that year, when another smoke shop decided to sell its business,
Sunesara, Virani, and Sohani acquired it, opening Burn Smoke Shop Two
(Burn II).31
In 2007, Sunesara incorporated SSV Corporation (SSV), which owned
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at *10.
24. 546 S.W.3d 393, 407 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
25. Id. at 396.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 396–97.




2019] Partnership Law 277
the assets of Zig Zag and later Burn I.32 Sunesara and Virani each owned
fifty percent of SSV, but monthly profits were split equally between
Sunesara, Virani, and Sohani.33 Before acquiring Burn II, Sohani and
Virani asked Sunesara to form limited liability companies for each of the
smoke shops.34 Sunesara signed the certificates of formation for each
LLC and filed them with the Texas Secretary of State, listing himself,
Virani, and Sohani as members of each LLC.35 Sunesara also set up bank
accounts for each of the LLCs.36 Sunesara, Virani, and Sohani all signed
the signature cards as members.37 Virani testified that he did not see the
certificates before filing and instructed Sunesara that only Virani and
Sohani would be the owners of the LLCs, and that Sunesara should not
have been listed as a member.38
In 2013, Virani and Sohani realized that the LLCs needed operating
agreements.39 Soon after, Virani and Sohani drafted and signed operating
agreements for each of the LLCs.40 The agreements included only Virani
and Sohani as members and listed each as having made fifty percent of
the contributions and owning fifty percent of the profits and assets.41
Sunesara claimed to be a member of each LLC, testified that he contrib-
uted $10,000 to both Burn I and Burn II, and agreed to deferred profits
until the inventory from MWI was paid off. However, there was no re-
ceipt or record of his contribution or the profit sharing arrangement.42
Virani testified that Sunesara did not contribute anything to Burn I, Burn
II, or Zig Zag.43 Virani and Sohani filed suit, claiming that Sunesara im-
properly listed himself as a member of the LLCs and was not entitled to
any share of the LLCs’ profits.44
The TBOC defines a member as someone admitted under the gov-
erning documents of the LLC.45 Members are not required to make con-
tributions;46 however, all entities are required to keep “books and records






38. Id. at 398–99.
39. Id. at 400.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 397.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 400.
45. Id. at 404; see also TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 1.002(53)(A) (“(53) ‘Member’
means: (A) in the case of a limited liability company, a person who is a member or has
been admitted as a member in the limited liability company under its governing
documents”).
46. Sohani, 546 S.W.3d at 405; see also TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.102(b)(1)
(“(b) A person is not required, as a condition to becoming a member of or acquiring a
membership interest in a limited liability company, to: (1) make a contribution to the
company”).
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of accounts”47 and LLCs must include a written account of “the amount
of a cash contribution and a description and statement of the agreed
value of any other contribution made or agreed to be made by each mem-
ber.”48 The TBOC provides that absent a written partnership agreement
that sets out the members’ share of profits and losses, the LLC profits
and losses are allocated to each member based on the agreed value of
members’ contributions as shown in the LLCs’ records.49
The court interpreted these sections as a requirement to keep written
records of contributions.50 Absent a written partnership agreement that
lays out ownership percentages, such contribution records establish each
member’s share of profits and losses.51 In this case, because there was no
specific writing or documentary evidence of the members’ contributions
or Sunesara’s profit share, the court held that he was not entitled to a
share of the LLCs’ profits.52 Oral testimony of Sunesara’s contributions
alone was insufficient.53 Nor could the tax records of previous entities
showing Sunesara’s profit shares serve as evidence of the LLC records, as
records do not carry over between new entities.54
This case serves as a warning. The partnership agreement determines
members’ percentage interests. Absent a written partnership agreement
that specifically states members’ ownership interests, however, profit and
loss shares are based on capital contributions. Thus, such contributions
must be carefully documented. If members cannot prove their capital
contributions, then they will receive no shares of the profits. Counsel
should ensure that steps are taken to adequately document each mem-
ber’s share of an LLC’s profits.
47. Sohani, 546 S.W.3d at 405 (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 3.151(a) (“(a)
Each filing entity shall keep: (1) books and records of accounts”)).
48. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.501(a)(7) (“(a) In addition to the
books and records required to be kept under Section 3.151, a limited liability company
shall keep at its principal office in the United States, or make available to a person at its
principal office in the United States not later than the fifth day after the date the person
submits a written request to examine the books and records of the company under Section
3.152(a) or 101.502: . . . (7) except as provided by Subsection (b), a written statement of:
(A) the amount of a cash contribution and a description and statement of the agreed value
of any other contribution made or agreed to be made by each member; (B) the dates any
additional contributions are to be made by a member; (C) any event the occurrence of
which requires a member to make additional contributions; (D) any event the occurrence
of which requires the winding up of the company; and (E) the date each member became a
member of the company.”)).
49. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.201 (“ALLOCATION OF PROF-
ITS AND LOSSES. The profits and losses of a limited liability company shall be allocated
to each member of the company on the basis of the agreed value of the contributions made
by each member, as stated in the company’s records required under Section 101.501.”)).




54. Id. at 407–08.
2019] Partnership Law 279
III. VEIL PIERCING
A. REVERSE VEIL PIERCING TO RECOVER FOR MEMBER’S FRAUD
In Clement v. Blackwood, the Eastland Court of Appeals considered
whether a partnership was liable for a husband and wife’s fraudulent ac-
tions related to the partnership’s cattle operation.55 Kyle and Valerie Cle-
ments (the Clements) convinced David and Sharon Blackwood (the
Blackwoods) to invest in a cattle and ranching operation operated by
Rimrock Land & Cattle Co., LLC (Rimrock), leading them to expect a
twenty percent return on their investment.56 It was orally agreed that the
Blackwoods would provide capital and the Clements would operate the
business through Rimrock.57 However, after the Blackwoods’ capital con-
tribution was deposited into Rimrock’s account, the Clements used much
of that money for personal use and the management of Clement Cattle
Co. L.L.C., (Clement Cattle), the Clements’ family company.58 Later,
Kyle Clements convinced David Blackwood to lend him an additional
$240,000 to avoid foreclosure on the Clements’ ranch, which was owned
by Clement Cattle, promising a quick and valuable return after all of the
cattle on the ranch were sold.59 However, when the cattle were sold and
the business of Rimrock ended, the Blackwoods received very little re-
turn, and suffered a loss of approximately $750,000, including the loan
which the Clements said they could not repay.60
The Blackwoods filed suit alleging several causes of action, including
fraud, conversion and misappropriation, and alter ego.61 The Blackwoods
argued that they should be able to recover damages from the assets of
Clement Cattle, which included a personal cattle herd and the Clements’
ranch that the Blackwoods’ loan saved from foreclosure.62 The jury
found, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the Clements committed
fraud against the Blackwoods in securing the investment in Rimrock and
the loan to Clement Cattle.63 Further, the jury found that the Clements
were personally responsible for the conduct of Clement Cattle and Rim-
rock under the theory of alter ego.64
55. Clement v. Blackwood, No. 11-16-00087-CV, 2018 WL 826856, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2018, pet. denied).
56. Id. at *1.
57. Id.
58. Id.




63. Id. at *4–5. The court of appeals held that there was sufficient evidence to show (1)
the Clements intended to perpetrate a fraud when they induced the Blackwoods to invest
in Rimrock; (2) the Clements did not intend to use the Blackwoods’ capital contribution as
promised; and (3) the loan was secured through fraudulent misrepresentations that David
Blackwood relied on to his detriment. Id.
64. Id. at *3. A court will disregard a corporate fiction on the basis of alter ego if there
is such a “unity” between an entity and an individual that the entity’s “separateness has
ceased.” See Doyle v. Kontemporary Builders, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 448, 458 (Tex. App.—Dal-
las 2012, pet. denied).
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The court considered whether there was sufficient evidence to support
the jury’s finding that Clement Cattle was an alter ego of the Clements
that could be held liable for the Clements’ fraud.65 Under Texas law, the
traditional veil piercing doctrine can be applied in reverse to hold a com-
pany’s assets accountable for the debts of individuals who treated that
company as their alter-ego.66 In making this determination, the court will
consider the entity’s “total dealings” with the individual, which includes
the amount of control the individual exercises over the entity and the
degree of financial interest and ownership, among other considerations.67
In addition, to pierce the company’s liability shield there must be evi-
dence that the individuals perpetrated actual fraud which “directly and
personally benefitted” the individuals.68
Clement Cattle and the Clements argued that the Blackwoods could
not recover damages from Clement Cattle’s assets because those assets
belonged to the company, not the Clements as individuals. They reasoned
that there was not enough evidence to pierce the corporate veil because
the Clements did not receive a direct benefit from the fraud. They addi-
tionally insisted that the only benefit the Clements received—avoiding
foreclosure on the ranch and continuing to live on it—was incidental and
not sufficient to establish a direct benefit because it was “akin to a share-
holder receiving property or a corporation reducing its debt.”69
The court rejected this argument, noting a significant distinction. In this
case, the purpose of Clement Cattle was to own the family ranch for the
personal use of Clements and not for a business purpose. Additionally,
the assets of the company were all used for personal reasons. In light of
this high degree of personal use, the court found that the benefit of living
and running a business on the ranch was in no way incidental, it was the
sole purpose of the entity’s creation. Therefore, all of the money that
Clement Cattle received from the Blackwoods’ investments directly
benefitted the Clements. The court held that this was sufficient evidence
that the Clements’ fraud resulted in a direct, personal benefit to the Cle-
ments. Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to
allow the Blackwoods to recover damages from Clement Cattle’s assets.70
Here, the court sharply rejected a married couple’s attempt to hide be-
hind the limited liability shield to escape liability for fraud. Further, it
65. Clement, 2018 WL 826856, at *5. The Clements did not challenge the finding that
Rimrock was their alter-ego. Id.
66. Id. (citing Wilson v. Davis, 305 S.W.3d 57, 70–71 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2009, no pet.); Dillingham v. Dillingham, 434 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth
1968, writ dism’d)).
67. Id. at *5 (citing Seghers v. El Bizri, 513 F. Supp. 2d 694, 703 (N.D. Tex. 2007)
(applying Texas law)).
68. Id. at *6; TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE. ANN. § 21.223(b).
69. Clement, 2018 WL 826856, at *6; see Solutioneers Consulting Ltd. v. Gulf Grey-
hound Partners, Ltd., 237 S.W.3d 379, 388–89 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet.
dism’d); Scott v. McKay, No. 12-02-00195-CV, 2003 WL 21998629, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler
Aug. 20, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.).
70. Clement, 2018 WL 826856, at *6; see Solutioneers Consulting Ltd., 237 S.W.3d at
388–89; Scott, 2003 WL 21998629, at *2.
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highlighted a distinction between a legitimate incidental benefit a share-
holder receives and the direct benefit an individual receives from an en-
tity that is created for no purpose other than to serve that individual’s
interests. An individual should be aware that the limited liability shield of
a partnership is not absolute, especially when the partnership is created
to directly benefit an individual perpetrating a fraud.
B. PIERCING THE VEIL OF AFFILIATED ENTITIES
WITH CENTRALIZED CONTROL
In U.S. KingKing, LLC v. Precision Energy Services, Inc., the First
Houston Court of Appeals considered whether a member of a limited
liability company could be held liable for the limited liability company’s
debts because the two entities were under centralized control, had a mu-
tual purpose, and shared finances.71 Amerril Energy, LLC (Amerril) ac-
ted as operator on an oil and gas lease held by U.S. KingKing, LLC
(King).72 King was a member of Amerril.73 In connection with the well
operation, Amerril took out a line of credit with several suppliers of
goods and services (collectively, Weatherford) and identified King as
Amerril’s “principal owner” on its credit application.74 When the well
was unsuccessful, Amerril failed to pay Weatherford for labor performed
and materials furnished.75
Weatherford sued Amerril for breach of contract and fraud, and also
sought to hold King liable for Amerril’s obligations under an alter ego
theory.76 Weatherford alleged that King purposely perpetrated actual
fraud by creating Amerril “as a shell entity with no control of any funds”
and “by failing to disclose the extent of King’s control.”77
In its motion for summary judgment on the alter ego issue, Weather-
ford relied on depositions from former employees of King and Amerril
that claimed: (1) King was the subsidiary of a corporation that also con-
trolled Amerril’s bank account; (2) Amerril’s funds were “filtered”
through King so that Amerril “had actually no local control”; (3) King
and Amerril had the same mailing address, with offices in different suites;
(4) the two companies shared two officers; (5) one employee of Amerril
helped prepare King’s tax returns; and (6) King “contributed” properties
to Amerril for no consideration.78 King did not file a response to Wea-
therford’s motion, and the trial court granted summary judgment.79 King
then moved for a new trial, claiming that, among other things, Weather-
71. U.S. KingKing, LLC v. Precision Energy Servs., Inc., 555 S.W.3d 200, 214 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
72. Id. at 204.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 204–05.
75. Id. at 205.
76. Id. at 206.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 207–09.
79. Id. at 209.
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ford failed to meet its burden to establish that Amerril was King’s alter
ego.80
On appeal, the court began with the principle that parties are not
“jointly liable for a [partnership’s] obligations merely because they were
part of a single business enterprise that is, merely because of centralized
control, mutual purposes, and shared finances.”81 Thus, in considering
whether Weatherford conclusively established that Amerril was the alter
ego of King, the court assessed the relationship between the entities, us-
ing several factors, to determine whether there was evidence of abuse of
Amerril’s corporate structure.82 The court noted that, while there was
evidence of shared control and finances, the Texas Supreme Court had
held that the “[c]reation of affiliated corporations to limit liability while
pursuing common goals lies firmly within the law and is commonplace.”83
Moreover, “courts have ‘never held corporations liable for each other’s
obligations merely because of centralized control, mutual purposes, and
shared finances.’”84
Considering this, the court held that the evidence Weatherford
presented at summary judgment was not sufficient to establish alter
ego.85 First, the fact that the companies shared a mailing address was out-
weighed by the fact that they had different business names and main-
tained offices in different suites.86 Second, while there was evidence of
one employee of Amerril performing administrative tasks for King, this
was outweighed by the fact that this was the only instance of such con-
duct, and there was no evidence that either entity paid the wages of em-
ployees of the other entity.87 Therefore, there was not sufficient evidence
to establish Weatherford’s claim that Amerril’s employees were routinely
handling the duties of the King.88 Finally, contrary to Weatherford’s
claims of “undocumented transfers of funds” between the two entities,
the contribution of assets from one entity to the other for purposes re-
lated to the common enterprise were well documented, and no evidence
was presented that suggested this practice was routine.89 Thus, there was
no evidence that King was improperly using any funds that Amerril col-
80. Id. at 210–11. At trial, Weatherford had the burden to prove that “no genuine
issues of material fact” existed and to “conclusively prove all essential elements of its
claim.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Cleveland v. Taylor, 397 S.W.3d 683, 696–97 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).
81. U.S. KingKing, 555 S.W.3d at 213 (citing Tryco Enters., 390 S.W.3d 497, 508 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. dism’d) (internal quotations omitted)).
82. Id. at 213–14 (These factors include “the degree to which corporate and individual
property have been kept separate, the amount of financial interest, ownership, and control
the individual maintains over the corporation, and whether the corporation has been used
for personal purposes.”) (citing Tryco Enters., 390 S.W.3d at 508).
83. Id. at 215 (internal quotations omitted); SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. Corp.,
275 S.W.3d 444, 455 (Tex. 2008).
84. U.S. KingKing, 555 S.W.3d at 215; SSP Partners, 275 S.W.3d at 455.
85. U.S. KingKing, 555 S.W.3d at 216–17.
86. Id. at 215.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 215–16.
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lected.90 Therefore, the court held that Weatherford had not established,
as a matter of law, that Amerril was the alter ego of King.91
This case offers a detailed application of the rule that centralized con-
trol, mutual purpose, and shared finances, on their own, do not constitute
alter ego for the purposes of piercing a partnership’s/LLC’s limited liabil-
ity shield. This is a helpful reminder for those counseling two entities that
share a common business purpose to be cautious in maintaining corpo-
rate formalities. Having different names, offices, and employees can help
a member avoid claims that it is the alter-ego of its partnership. Further,
counsel should advise clients to document all transfers of funds between
two commonly owned entities and to only use funds in line with their
common purpose.
IV. PERSONAL LIABILITY OF A MEMBER
A. LIABILITY FOR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION THAT
VIOLATES REGULATIONS
In State v. Morello, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether a
limited liability company can shield its members from liability for a viola-
tion of environmental regulations that apply to persons in their individual
capacities.92 Bernard Morello (Morello) entered into a contract to buy
land that was subject to a hazardous waste permit and compliance plan
issued by the predecessor to the Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality (TCEQ) because of groundwater contamination.93 After discov-
ering the contamination, but before acquiring the property, Morello
formed White Lion Holdings, L.L.C. (White Lion) to acquire title to the
land.94 At closing, the seller transferred the property, along with the per-
mit and compliance plan, directly to White Lion, and TCEQ approved
the transfers.95 In the two years after White Lion’s acquisition of the land,
TCEQ sent multiple notices to White Lion and Morello of violations of
the compliance plan, including failure to (1) perform groundwater moni-
toring programs; (2) comply with reporting requirements; and (3) provide
assurance of financial capability to fulfill the compliance plan.96
The State of Texas (State) filed suit against White Lion and later added
Morello as a defendant, alleging failure to comply with the compliance
plan.97 After the trial court granted summary judgment against White
Lion, the State moved for summary judgment against Morello, alleging
that because Morello was personally involved with the operation and
management of the property, he was also liable for the violation of the
90. Id. at 216.
91. Id. at 216–17.
92. State v. Morello, 547 S.W.3d 881, 885 (Tex. 2018).
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same permit under the Texas Water Code (Water Code).98 The trial court
granted the motion for summary judgment and awarded civil penalties
against Morello, but the Austin Court of Appeals reversed.99 The State
appealed to the supreme court, arguing that the plain language of the
Water Code shows the legislature intended for individuals, not just corpo-
rations, to be liable for environmental violations.100 On appeal, Morello
argued that he could not be held liable because TBOC Section 101.114
says that a member or manager of a company is not personally liable for a
debt, obligation, or liability of the company.101
The supreme court began by examining the language of the Water
Code. Section 7.101 of the Water Code provides that a “person may not
cause” a violation of a TCEQ statute or permit, and Section 7.102 pro-
vides for civil penalties against “[a] person who causes” a violation of a
TCEQ statute or permit.102 The code does not define the word “person.”
First, in considering what the term “person” meant in this context, the
supreme court looked to the rules of grammar and common usage, and
rejected Morello’s attempt to use the same defined term from another
statute.103 The supreme court held that the term “person” in the Water
Code includes individuals, along with corporations, organizations, and
other legal entities, because the definition did not expressly exclude indi-
viduals and the common usage of the term references an individual.104
Thus, the State could assess a penalty against Morello as an individual.105
Second, the supreme court held that nothing in the Water Code limited
the State from assessing a penalty against both White Lion and Morello,
because the section broadly referred to “a” person and did not restrict
the scope of liability to “the” one person responsible for the violation.106
Next, the supreme court considered whether the language used in the
Water Code applied to Morello’s personal actions. Morello argued that it
didn’t, insisting that he was only acting as an agent of White Lion.107 The
supreme court rejected this argument and analogized this case to a previ-
ous supreme court decision, which held a corporate officer liable for per-
sonally participating in a violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
98. Id. at 884.
99. Id.; see Morello v. State, 539 S.W.3d 330, 341 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016), rev’d, 547
S.W.3d 881 (Tex. 2018).
100. Morello, 547 S.W.3d at 885.
101. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.114).
102. Id. at 886; TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.101-102.
103. Morello, 547 S.W.3d at 886 (citing Cadena Commercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alco-
holic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 325 (Tex. 2017)). Morello argued that the defini-
tion of “person” from the Solid Waste Disposal Act (1) did not include individuals and (2)
should apply in this case. However, the court refused to decide whether or not the Solid
Waste Disposal Act definition applied because, either way, that definition did not expressly
exclude individuals. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.003(23).
104. Morello, 547 S.W.3d at 886 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1324 (10th ed. 2014)
(defining “person” as “[a] human being”)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 886.
107. Id.
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Act, even though he was acting in the scope of his employment.108 The
supreme court also took note that another Texas Court of Appeals had
interpreted the legislative intent of the Water Code “to impose more
stringent standards when dealing with hazardous waste disposal and to
assure that each person be held accountable for his actions that violate
the code.”109 Further, the supreme court held that an officer cannot be
shielded from liability as an agent where a statute applies directly to a
“person” in their individual capacity.110 Thus, the supreme court con-
cluded that when an individual has personally participated in violative
conduct under an environmental regulation applicable to a “person,” the
corporate shield cannot protect that individual from personal liability for
such conduct.111
The supreme court rebutted Morello’s other arguments and reasoned
that Morello’s liability was not a “debt, obligation, or liability” that would
be prohibited under the TBOC.112 Instead, the liability was based on his
“individual, personal” actions as officer of White Lion that caused the
permit to be violated, including failure to comply with the reporting,
monitoring and financial assurance requirements of the compliance plan,
even after multiple notifications from TCEQ.113 The supreme court re-
versed the court of appeals decision and held Morello liable for civil pen-
alties under the Water Code.
The Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Morello significantly broadens
the potential liability of members personally involved in the operations
and management of a partnership that violates environmental regula-
tions. Further, this case could provide precedent for future courts to dis-
regard the shield from personal liability in a wide variety of other
contexts. The statutory analysis that the court performed in Morello could
easily translate to any other provision of the Texas code that provides for
liability for a “person” and does not define that term to exclude individu-
als. Practitioners should be mindful of Morello’s holding and consider this
case in a variety of contexts beyond the Water Code.
108. Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712, 719–20 (Tex. 2002). The supreme court’s decision
was also bolstered by two similar lower court cases and multiple federal court cases. See Ex
parte Canady, 140 S.W.3d 845, 850–51 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.)
(concluding that employees of a company that paid an administrative penalty for Water
Code violations could be prosecuted individually); State v. Malone Serv. Co., 853 S.W.2d
82, 85 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (concluding that the president
and plant manager of a company could be held individually liable for Water Code viola-
tions even though they did not hold the permit); see also Riverside v. Mkt. Dev. Corp. Int’l
Bldg. Prods., Inc., 931 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that individuals could not
hide behind the corporate shield when they “actually participate in the wrongful
conduct”).
109. Ex parte Canady, 140 S.W.3d at 850–51.
110. Morello, 547 S.W.3d at 886–88.
111. Id. at 888.
112. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.114).
113. Id. at 888, 883.
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B. LIABILITY FOR DEBT INCURRED BEFORE CHARTER FORFEITURE
In Haynes v. Gay, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered an individ-
ual’s liability for a partnership debt that was created prior to the forfei-
ture of the company’s charter. Richard Gay (Creditor) filed a petition
against Willie and Brita Haynes (Members) claiming that the Members
owed him $1,257.40 for breach of a property management agreement
(Agreement), which had terminated on February 24, 2014, between Sky
Group, LLC (Sky Group) and the Creditor.114 At trial, evidence was
presented that the Members were the sole members of Sky Group and
that Sky Group had forfeited its certificate of charter with the state on
August 7, 2015.115 Creditor argued that because Sky Group’s charter had
been forfeited prior to his claim, the Members were personally liable for
Sky Group’s debt.116 In response, the Members argued that they were not
personally liable because (1) the contract was only with Sky Group and
not the Members in their personal capacity; and (2) the contractual obli-
gations arose before Sky Group’s charter was forfeited.117 The trial court
found for Creditor, and the Members appealed.118
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that
the Members could not be held personally liable for Sky Group’s debt.119
While a member is generally shielded from personal liability for a limited
liability company’s debts, if the limited liability company’s charter is for-
feited, its members are liable for the debts incurred in Texas after the due
date and before revival of the corporate privileges.120 Further, “where a
debt arises out of the performance or implementation of the provisions of
a contract,” courts have held that the debt is “created or incurred” on the
date the parties entered into the contract.121 Considering this, the court
held that even though the date of the property management agreement
was not apparent in the record, it was clear that the debt was “created or
incurred” before the agreement terminated in February 2014.122 There-
fore, because the debt was “created or incurred” prior to the 2015 forfei-
ture of Sky Group’s charter, the Members were protected by the shield of
the limited liability company and could not be held personally liable for
Sky Group’s debt.
In Haynes, the Dallas Court of Appeals clarified when the limited lia-
bility shield of a limited liability company is effective. While the court






119. Id. at *2–3.
120. Id. at *2; TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.114; TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.255(a).
121. Haynes, 2018 WL 774334, at *2; Rossman v. Bishop Colo. Retail Plaza, L.P. 455
S.W.3d 797, 804 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied); see also Hovel v. Batzri, 490 S.W.3d
132, 138–44 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
122. Haynes, 2018 WL 774334, at *2.
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held that the liability shield was effective under the circumstances, the
Haynes decision should serve to remind members of a limited liability
company to fulfill all requirement under the TBOC to ensure that the
charter of the limited liability company is not forfeited.
V. DERIVATIVE SUIT STANDING
A. DERIVATIVE SUIT STANDING OF LIMITED PARTNERS
In re Marriage of Dilick123 explored the limits of limited partner stand-
ing to bring a derivative claim on behalf of a partnership. Jay Cohen (Co-
hen) and Matthew Dilick (Dilick) formed three limited partnerships to
develop certain real property owned by Cohen. Dilick owned nineteen
percent of each partnership as a limited partner and one percent of each
partnership as the general partner and Cohen owned eighty percent of
each partnership as a limited partner.124 In 2010, Cohen sued Dilick de-
rivatively on the partnerships’ behalf, alleging misuse of partnership as-
sets.125 Cohen accused Dilick of improperly using partnership assets for
Dilick’s personal benefit.126 Before the case went to trial, the partner-
ships filed for bankruptcy and a bankruptcy trustee was appointed for the
partnerships (Trustee), who took over Cohen’s claims and instituted an
adversary proceeding.127 Concurrently, Dilick was in the midst of a di-
vorce.128 The Trustee intervened in the divorce case to preserve the part-
nership property that was community property and to prevent the divorce
judgment from unfavorably impacting the adversary proceeding.129 The
Trustee alleged that partnership property was used as collateral to ac-
quire loans in violation of the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act
(TUFTA).130 Dilick counterclaimed under TUFTA for attorneys’ fees for
the Trustee’s petition in intervention.131 The Trustee settled with Mrs.
Dilick and a final order nonsuiting the Trustee’s claims was entered, but
the divorce court left outstanding Dilick’s claim for attorneys’ fees under
TUFTA.132 Three months later, the court entered an order awarding
Dilick $123,000 in attorneys’ fees.133 The Trustee appealed the award, but
before perfecting the appeal the partnerships’ bankruptcy proceedings
were dismissed.134 On the appeal of the attorneys’ fees award, Dilick ar-
gued that the Trustee lost standing when the bankruptcy cases were dis-
missed.135 Cohen sought to be substituted for the Trustee as a limited
123. 550 S.W.3d 766, 772 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
124. Id.




129. Id. at 769–70.
130. Id. at 770.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 770–71.
134. Id. at 771.
135. Id.
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partner bringing suit on behalf of the partnerships or alternatively to in-
tervene in the appeal by virtual representation.136
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals found that there was no
authority to support that a Trustee lacks standing to appeal a judgment
signed when the Trustee did have standing.137 However, the court did not
rule on this issue because, regardless, Cohen lacked standing to substitute
for the Trustee.138 Limited partners do not have standing to assert claims
that belong to the partnership.139 The TBOC, however, allows a limited
partner to sue on behalf of a partnership to recover a judgment in the
partnership’s favor if the general partner refuses or is unlikely to do so.140
Crucially the court distinguished this case, noting that Cohen was trying
to appeal a judgment against the partnership not recover one in its
favor.141 Thus, Cohen could not substitute in the appeal since the statu-
tory requirements were not met.142
Nor could Cohen appeal under virtual representation.143 The first re-
quirement of virtual representation is that the party be bound by the
judgment.144 A key aspect of a limited partnership, however, is that lim-
ited partners are not liable for the obligations of the partnership.145 As a
limited partner, therefore, Cohen was not bound by the judgment against
the partnership and so could not assert virtual representation.
Here, the court limited a limited partner’s standing to bring a deriva-
tive suit. The court interpreted the TBOC to only allow limited partners
to appeal judgments against the partnership, differentiating appeals in
favor of the partnership. The court similarly interpreted the doctrine of
virtual representation to eliminate standing because limited partners can-
not be bound by a judgment. Limited partners should be aware of the
narrow category of appeals for which they have derivative standing and
include provisions in the governing documents of their partnership that
136. Id.
137. Id. at 772.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 773 (citing, as applied to appellate standing, Spates v. Office of Attorney
Gen., 485 S.W.3d 546, 550–51 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.)).
140. Id. at 773–74 (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 153.401 (“RIGHT TO
BRING ACTION. A limited partner may bring an action in a court on behalf of the lim-
ited partnership to recover a judgment in the limited partnership’s favor if: (1) all general
partners with authority to bring the action have refused to bring the action; or (2) an effort
to cause those general partners to bring the action is not likely to succeed.”)).
141. Id. at 774.
142. Id.
143. Id. The doctrine of virtual representation is an exception to the rule that only a
party to the judgment may appeal. City of San Benito v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., 109
S.W.3d 750, 754–55 (Tex. 2003). Virtual representation allows a “deemed party” to appeal
if (1) the party is bound by the judgment; (2) there is privity of estate, title, or interest on
the record; and (3) there is identity of interests between the party and a party to the judg-
ment. Motor Vehicle Bd. v. El Paso Indep. Auto Dealers Ass’n, 1 S.W.3d 108, 110 (Tex.
2015).
144. Marriage of Dilick, 550 S.W.3d at 774 (citing Motor Vehicle Bd., 1 S.W.3d at 110).
145. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 153.102(a) (“(a) A limited partner is not
liable for the obligations of a limited partnership . . .”)).
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grant the limited partners the authority to bring a broader set of deriva-
tive claims.
B. DERIVATIVE SUIT STANDING FORMER MEMBERS
The Austin Court of Appeals sharply rejected derivative suits by for-
mer members in In re LoneStar Logo & Signs, LLC146 and demanded
present ownership status to meet standing requirements. In 2006, Media
Choice, LLC (Media Choice) and Quorum Media, LLC (Quorum) were
jointly awarded the Texas Department of Transportation’s (TxDOT) ten-
year contract for logo signs along Texas highways.147 Media Choice and
Quorum together formed LoneStar Logos & Signs, LLC (LoneStar 1) to
perform their duties under the logo sign contract.148 In 2016, TxDOT be-
gan soliciting bids for a new logo sign contract.149 Media Choice bid on
and was awarded the new contract.150 Media Choice created another en-
tity to perform the contract obligations, LoneStar Logos Management
Company, LLC (LoneStar 2).151 LoneStar 1 had six members, including
Media Choice and Dunster Live, LLC (Dunster).152 Lonestar 2 had five
members, all of which were the same as LoneStar 1, excluding only Dun-
ster.153 It was on this basis that Dunster sued, asserting individual claims
and a derivative claim on behalf of LoneStar 1 that the members wrong-
fully used the assets of LoneStar 1 to benefit LoneStar 2.154 While the
other members admitted to intentionally excluding Dunster from LoneS-
tar 2, they refuted Dunster’s claims and challenged Dunster’s standing,
claiming Dunster ceased to be a member of LoneStar 1 before filing
suit.155 The other members asserted that Dunster was no longer a mem-
ber of LoneStar 1 after LoneStar 1’s managers caused LoneStar 1 to re-
deem Dunster’s interest for failure to pay a capital call.156 Dunster
disputed the validity of such redemption and also maintained that mem-
bership in LoneStar 1 was only required at the time the claim accrued.157
In analyzing this case, the court examined corporate shareholder deriv-
ative action principles, noting that such principles are “materially identi-
cal extensions or analogues” of the principles of LLC derivative claims.158
The court stated the rule that members must have continuing ownership
status throughout the prosecution, otherwise they do not have standing to
bring a derivative suit on behalf of the entity.159
146. 552 S.W.3d 342, 343 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, no pet.).
147. Id. at 343.
148. Id. at 343–44.
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Under the statutory standing160 provisions of the TBOC, a member
must have been a member at the time of the act or omission at issue in
order to bring a derivative claim.161 Section 101.463, however, provides
that closely held LLCs are subject to different requirements and that the
statutory standing sections, among others, do not apply.162 This exemp-
tion was included in order to make it easier for such members to bring a
derivative suit.163 While seemingly broad, the court interprets this exemp-
tion narrowly, holding that a derivative suit must still be derivative and
that it is a “fundamental” characteristic that a member have a “present
ownership interest in the entity on whose behalf it purports to sue.”164
Both Section 101.452’s statutory standing and Section 101.463, according
to the court, still intended that derivative suits be brought by a member
and imply that member status must be maintained for the duration of the
suit.165 The court found that Dunster was a former member and as such
had not maintained membership during the suit so Dunster could not
meet the standing requirements.166
The decision in this case significantly narrows derivative suit standing.
Membership is not only required at the time the claim arose, but it must
also be maintained in order to sue on behalf of an entity. This holding
could eliminate claims of former members and narrows statutory stand-
ing. LLC members should consider this case when determining if deriva-
tive standing exists.
VI. CONCLUSION
This selection of cases underscores the need to carefully read and re-
spect statutory requirements. From the enforceability of term sheets to
the documentation of entities to the definition of “person,” the theme of
this Survey period was careful adherence to the letter of the law. Cases
hinged on the differentiation between judgments for or against a partner-
ship and incidental versus direct benefits. Courts parsed these fine dis-
tinctions to present highly relevant examples and warnings for counsel.
This Survey period further emphasizes the ever-changing nature of part-
nership law, and the importance of monitoring developments as courts
continue to expound upon the principles illustrated here.
160. Id. at 348 (quoting Sneed v. Webre, 465 S.W.3d 169, 181 (Tex. 2015)).
161. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.452).
162. Id. at 349.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 350 (internal quotations omitted).
165. Id. at 351.
166. Id. at 352–53.
